In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diasporic Impulses:Sikh Philosophy as an AssemblageArvind-Pal S. Mandair (bio)Let me begin this response by thanking the editors of Philosophy East and West for generously allowing space for this review forum on my recent book, Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), and thanking the reviewers Monika-Kirloskar Steinbach, Ananda Abeysekara, and Jeffery Long for their careful readings of this work. "Sikh Philosophy" names the modern (...) academic discourse that crystallized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a result of the encounter between modern Western philosophy and gurmat, a mode of thought-praxis deriving from and associated with Sikhi (lit. "the path of learning"), a spiritual-philosophical tradition hailing from India, which most readers may only have encountered through the modern knowledge system's categorization of it as the religion known as Sikhism. To avoid complicating the discussion, I will be referring interchangeably to gurmat and Sikh philosophy, even though they represent quite different entities. Gurmat represents a tradition of thought-praxis that goes back to Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhi, whereas Sikh philosophy is a modern formation that emerged from the encounter between gurmat and European thought, which is why I prefer to regard it as an assemblage. The book examines some of the key concepts of Sikh philosophy and how they inform its vision of life, what they tell us about the nature of reality, and whether it is possible to discern a distinct logic, epistemology, and ontology based on the principles of gurmat. In their reviews, Kirloskar-Steinbach, Abeysekara, and Long have provided critical readings and insightful questions, which I address below.Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach asks about the relationship between Sikh philosophy and Indian philosophy, noting that my book does not explicitly engage Indian philosophy. Specifically, she raises two questions: (1) whether Sikh philosophy should or potentially could be part of the broader field of Indian philosophy, and (2) whether I would be inclined to contribute to that field, particularly in light of recent efforts to diversify philosophical practices within Indian philosophy by scholars like Jonardon Ganeri in his Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy (2017) and Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner in their History of Indian Philosophy (2018). My immediate response would be "yes," but with an important caveat. In that vein, I applaud Ganeri's and Bilimoria/Rayner's efforts to open up philosophical inquiry within Indian traditions and take them beyond darśanic framings that narrowly positioned different thought-practices of South Asia either within or [End Page 364] in relation to the Brahmanical/Vedic/Sanskritic paradigm. Ganeri's "multiperspectival" narrative about practices might well enable discussions about Sikh philosophy to flourish, given that the lexicon of gurmat (the teaching, logic, practice of the Guru) is replete with concepts that have cognate terms in the main Hindu philosophical schools including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; the Jain and Buddhist traditions; and perhaps most importantly, within the Islamic, especially Sufi, traditions. It is the seeming parity between cognate terms such as the Punjabi dharam (Skt. dharma), karam (Skt. karma), yoga, śabad (Skt. śabda), guru, hukam, and many more, which has given rise to the misperception that Sikh philosophy is a purely syncretic thought system parasitic on earlier Indic systems. A similar misperception might be that Sikhi is more primarily a mode of lived praxis or dharam than it is a philosophy (Bhogal 2018) and therefore has less to do with thought than with spiritual attainment. But this approach is far too narrow in that it opposes "philosophy"/"thought" to spiritual praxis without asking whether there might be a broader definition of thinking at play within Sikhi or gurmat. Such an approach fails to extricate itself from the legacy of imperial categorizations of Indic traditions as essentially religious and therefore unrelated to what is called "thinking." By doing so, it falls prey to another misconception many have, that the closest Indians have come to philosophical thought are the darśanic schools, not realizing that most Indian philosophers and thinkers were at the same time devotees and spiritual adepts who developed rigorous modes of discipline and practice.Having said this, I would premise any... (shrink)

The concept śabad (Word) is central to Sikh scripture, doctrine, philosophy and spiritual praxis. This lecture offers a postsecular interpretation of this important concept and examines the passage of śabad from premodern scriptural sources to its entanglement in contemporary "wars of scholarship".

Review of Arvind-Pal S. Mandair, Religion and the Specter of the West: Sikhism, India, Postcoloniality, and the Politics of Translation Content Type Journal Article Pages 499-501 DOI 10.1007/s11841-011-0250-8 Authors Brian K. Pennington, Division of Humanities, Maryville College, 502 E. Lamar Alexander Pkwy, Maryville, TN 37804, USA Journal Sophia Online ISSN 1873-930X Print ISSN 0038-1527 Journal Volume Volume 50 Journal Issue Volume 50, Number 3.

Arguing that intellectual movements, such as deconstruction, postsecular theory, and political theology, have different implications for cultures and societies that live with the debilitating effects of past imperialisms, Arvind Mandair ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Appreciation of Arvind Mandair's Sikh Philosophy:Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing WorldJeffery D. Long (bio)"Sikhism," the Colonial Project, and Modernity1I do not use this adjective lightly, but in his brilliant volume Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022) Arvind-Pal Singh Mandair goes a considerable distance toward liberating sikhī—known more widely in the academic world as Sikhism—from the conceptual constraints that (...) have kept it from engaging with and informing global issues. In so doing, he does a service not only to the Sikh community and to sikhī itself, but to the world, for there is indeed much in Sikh thought from which the wider human community can benefit. By liberating sikhī from the constraining concept of religion, Mandair facilitates a process by which persons of any background can engage with gurmat ideas—that is, ideas drawn from the system of thought based upon the teachings of the Gurus of the Sikh tradition—and learn from their wisdom.Mandair skillfully deconstructs the concept of religion, building upon earlier work in which he demonstrates the colonial functionalities of this concept.2 When, through colonial knowledge-production processes, sikhī came to be conceived as a religion, Sikh thought was relegated to the realm of theology. This was a relegation, not an elevation, because under the dominant paradigm of modernity, theology is seen as a discourse that is relevant only to a specific religious community. It is thus perceived as lacking the universality [End Page 353] that is taken to inhere in the discourses of philosophy or science. When combined with the colonial situation of Sikhs under British rule, this relegation of Sikh thought to the realm of theology becomes a way of exerting power over the community. As Mandair explains,Once theology had become the primary regime of cultural translation, Sikh thinking was inevitably tethered to the social and political project of religious identification which was required primarily to facilitate governance of cultural differences or heterogeneity that characterized the indigenous populations [of India]. By doing so, it effectively locked Sikh activity within the confines of identity politics.(p. 10)Integral to British colonial policy in India was a project of defining communities, primarily on the basis of religion, but also deploying concepts such as caste and tribe. Through these definitions, the identities of Indians could be essentialized, and policies applied to them in ways that facilitated British dominance over Indian society.3Much has been written about the ways in which language is used to promote ideologies that serve to advance the power interests of some groups of people over others.4 No less an ideological mechanism than the Oxford English Dictionary has been brought to bear in the process of constraining sikhī and depriving it of the universal relevance that it ought naturally to possess. In Mandair's words, "By defining 'Sikhism' as the beliefs and practices of Sikhs, or as an Indian monotheistic religion founded in fifteenth-century India, the OED turns the Sikh aspect into a cliché—a religious type (monotheism), an ethnic type tied to a geographical location (Punjabi/North India) and a historical type (medieval India)" (p. 11).The damage that has been wrought by the modern colonial concept of religion globally is, of course, not limited exclusively to the Sikh community. It has been integral to the construction of a secular order in which what is regarded as religious thought is, again, relegated to a parochial realm of relevance only to members of specific communities. It further serves to marginalize these same communities, whose discourses come to be seen as lacking the universality of secular thought, which is presented as objective truth. As Mandair continues,The purpose of creating the modern category of 'religion' was to help authorize and naturalize secular rationality as the dominant form of modern consciousness, and as the essential language of conventional thinking, or 'common sense.' It is precisely this common sense which persuades us of the apparent naturalness of oppositions such as religion versus politics or materiality versus ideality, to give two well-known examples.(p. 11)To these two examples, one could add the opposition of religion and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sikhism between Tradition and "Assemblage":Reflections on Arvind Mandair's Sikh PhilosophyAnanda Abeysekara (bio)Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World. By Arvind-Pal Singh Mandair. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.My central concern in this essay is how to think about the relation between genealogy and tradition in Arvind Mandair's Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (London: Bloomsbury, 2022). I begin with a (...) brief discussion of a lecture titled "A Genealogy of Liberty" delivered by Quentin Skinner at the University of California, Berkeley in 2008, which he would give again, with minor changes, in 2015 at the University of Chicago and in 2017 at Stanford University. At the outset of the lecture, joining forces with Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, he says, "Here I am a Nietzschean, and it is reflected in my title"—contending that "concepts [like liberty] that have histories cannot have definitions." In giving a concise history of the rival "polemical" claims made by Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Mill, Arendt, Taylor, and others about the concept of liberty, Skinner concludes that, contrary to what Anglo-American philosophy claims, there is not one "coherent way of thinking about liberty" in its contested genealogy. And "while each of these accounts is coherent in its own terms, you cannot combine them. This is genealogy. You can't get this to be the concept of liberty. You are going to have to make some choices, because they don't fit together. So what choice should you make? As to the answer, I leave that up to you" (Skinner 2016).The puzzle of how to think about such a genealogy was palpable in the questions from the audience that followed Skinner's lecture. Noteworthy was one question, about how the thinkers—for example from Hobbes to John Stuart Mill—in the history of the debate about liberty seem to "move around," their views seeming to "bleed into one another" (Skinner 2015). That is, isn't John Stuart Mill's view of liberty—as something that one can voluntarily renounce by internalizing the external views or customs—more or less the same as Hobbes' view of liberty as something free from external interference? And hence don't these competing views after all "fit together" within a single narrative? Ultimately, the concern here boils down to a question about the definition of liberty. [End Page 333]But what the presupposition in the question misses is that each of these positions—as Skinner carefully argues—is "ideological," "polemical," and "contested"; that is, these positions—even though Skinner does not say this explicitly—are marked by distinct forms of historical sensibility. That each of the historical positions, again as Skinner rightly argues, is "coherent" already grants that the sensibilities that define them within their specific conditions cannot be reproduced. That is, to extend Skinner's argument, these sensibilities cannot simply be "combined" within a seamless narrative because they presuppose relationships of power in which they have the force of intelligibility that they do in particular historical contexts. But the presumption about the meaning of a concept—for example the concept of "creativity" or "emptiness"—that can be readily and universally identified in a historical narrative is prevalent in other disciplines like Buddhist studies and South Asian studies, where, despite scholars using the term, genealogy remains poorly thought through (Abeysekara 2023; Walser 2018).1Largely absent in Skinner's genealogy is any discussion of the concept of "tradition" itself even though at times he alludes to "the tradition of liberty." This may not be a simple oversight on Skinner's part, but its very absence raises the question of whether liberalism itself is a discursive, embodied tradition in the ways a religious tradition works, as conceptualized by Talal Asad and others. Asad has described liberalism itself as a certain kind of "tradition" constituted by historical disputes (Asad 2009).2 And the broader implication of that argument is that, because it is a tradition animated by the very debates about what constitutes it, those who make claims about it are already situated within that tradition. And so it is unsound to speak of multiple traditions of liberty and, by extension, "multiple modernities... (shrink)

Despite the prevalence of post-colonial theory in the humanities and social sciences, why is it that the two main secular formations in the study of religion(s), as philosophy of religion and history of religions, continue to deploy very similar mechanisms that reconstitute past imperialisms such as the hegemony of theory as specifically Western and/or the division of labor between universal and particular knowledge formations? To answer this question this paper stages an oblique engagement between the seemingly divergent discourses: (i) philosophy (...) of religion, (ii) history of religion—more specifically the area specialism called South Asian religions, and (iii) post-colonial theory especially where these discourses intersect with the discipline of Indology and the representation of Indic phenomena. A different version of this engagement occurs in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (LPR). A post-colonial reading of the LPR reveals closer and often unacknowledged connections between the birth of these two disciplines. More importantly the LPR anticipates the auto-immunizing mechanism that underpins the continued lack of engagement between the various disciplines of contemporary religions. Ironically, this mechanism, it will be argued, is located in the very heart of the comparative enterprise itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sikh Philosophy as a Philosophy-of-PracticeMonika Kirloskar-Steinbach (bio)Some recent publications on Indian philosophy argue that the colonial narrative about the philosophical traditions from the subcontinent was erroneous. It wrongly suggested that the erstwhile Brahmanic thought embodied by the darśanas was an exhaustive representation of philosophical activity on the subcontinent and that this activity came to a grinding halt with the onset of European modernity. In an attempt at rectifying this (...) story, one path proposed by philosopher Vrinda Dalmiya (Dalmiya 2016, p. 125) is to cognize and fix the "epistemophilic excesses" in the field, that is, the obsessive compulsion in conventional academic philosophy to engage in theory for theory's sake. In the study of Indian philosophy, this malady manifests as the practice of channeling philosophical analysis solely through a darśanic framing. This monofocal lens, however, is unable to reflect either the diversity of practices on the ground or values like intellectual freedom that drive some such practices.Arvind-Pal Mandair's Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), discussed here in this forum, speaks to these concerns and offers a possible way forward. Sikh Philosophy advocates a liminal perspective from which to engage with the set of philosophical practices that emanated on the subcontinent around the figure of Guru Nanak (1469–1539) and the teachings of the Sikh gurus (gurmat). In the first part of my response, I will bring into this conversation Mandair's philosophical orientation to ask whether and how he would contribute to that debate. In the second part, I will project the haumai—one concept doing much of the work in Sikh Philosophy—as one viable path that may be able to contribute to the correction of the epistemophilia currently afflicting a judicious study of world-philosophical traditions.In my limited understanding, Mandair's rendition of the haumai may serve as one component that could be implemented fruitfully in broadening the perspective on Indian philosophy. Mandair observes that a postcolonial sensibility demands a philosophical orientation that does not continue its proprietary attitude toward philosophical positions. I share his view. Instead of parading these positions as possessions that embellish one's academic finesse, they should be considered as ways of navigating life adequately. In doing so, however, the making of such navigational routes may profit from a deliberate reflection on them from different standpoints. [End Page 348]Halting Exclusivist Historiographical Trends in PhilosophyTwo recent handbooks on Indian philosophy reflect the growing awareness that changes in the field's self-understanding are imperative, should imperialist and colonial historiographies that affect this understanding be upturned. Jonardon Ganeri's editorial introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy—"Why Indian Philosophy? Why Now?"—argues that students of Indian philosophy should overcome the routinized fixation on the classical darśanas. In developing their accounts, they should factor in the "regionality, vernaculars, subaltern communities, [and] eccentrics" through which "scholarly networks, nodes of philosophical activity, transnational encounters, and contexts of philosophical invention" arose on the subcontinent (Ganeri 2017, p. 2). This broader approach would, in his view, not only be viable in halting the elitist and exclusivist historiography that was the default mode in the recent colonial past. In addition, it would be better equipped to grasp the richness of practices on the ground.Accordingly, his Handbook departs from the handbook genre on one core point: instead of delivering a supposedly comprehensive study of positions that would be indispensable to the reader to understand the intricacies of the field marked out as Indian philosophy, this Handbook chooses to narrate one multi-perspectival story about practices on the subcontinent that were philosophically motivated and are worthy of study today. It suggests through this move that there are other such possible stories that can be narrated. Relatedly, Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner's History of Indian Philosophy strives as well to make a case to go beyond the darśanic mold. It includes a variety of philosophical positions located on its peripheries. For example, Sikh philosophy, which notably is not included in the Ganeri volume, is incorporated here as a tradition that engaged darśanic practices. Balbinder Singh Bhogal, the author of... (shrink)

There is a disparity between the multitude of apparently successful expert system prototypes and the scarcity of expert systems in real everyday use. Modern tools make it deceptively easy to make reasonable prototypes, but these prototypes are seldom made subject to serious evaluation. Instead the development team confronts their product with a set of cases, and the primary evaluation criterion is the percentage of correct answers: we are faced with a “95% syndrome”. Other aspects related to the use of the (...) system are almost ignored. There is still a long way to go from a promising prototype to a final system.It is maintained in the article that a useful test must be performed by future users in a situation that is as realistic as possible. If this is not done claims of usefulness cannot be justified. It is also stated that prototyping does not make “traditional” analysis and design obsolete, although the contents of these activities will change.In order to discuss the effects of using the systems a distinction between expert systems as media, tools and experts is proposed. (shrink)

Christianity during Portuguese era in Kerala, India.

Ethics consultation is a commonly applied mechanism to address clinical ethical dilemmas. However, there is little information on the viewpoints of health care providers towards the relevance of ethics committees and appropriate application of ethics consultation in clinical practice. We sought to use qualitative methodology to evaluate free-text responses to a case-based survey to identify thematically the views of health care professionals towards the role of ethics committees in resolving clinical ethical dilemmas. Using an iterative and reflexive model we identified (...) themes that health care providers support a role for ethics committees and hospitals in resolving clinical ethical dilemmas, that the role should be one of mediation, rather than prescription, but that ultimately legal exposure was dispositive compared to ethical theory. The identified theme of legal fears suggests that the mediation role of ethics committees is viewed by health care professionals primarily as a practical means to avoid more worrisome medico-legal conflict. (shrink)

ObjectiveOur objective was to evaluate whether those individuals with previous involvement with formal clinical ethics processes differ in their attitudes towards the resolution of prototypical clinical ethics cases than general health care professionals. We hypothesized that those individuals with previous participation in ethics consultation would have significantly different attitudes on the appropriate role of ethics committees in the assessment and resolution of clinical ethical dilemmas than those who have not.MethodsWe conducted a case-based survey of health care professionals at six US (...) hospitals. We administered the survey to health care professionals in a variety of clinical roles at each center and further sub-categorized these by respondents reporting or not reporting their membership on an ethics committee or participation as an ethics consultant/requestor of ethics consult services. Using the analysis of variance test, we present the variation in attitudes using a 5-point Likert scale with 95% confidence intervals and significance set at p ≤ 0.05.ResultsA total of 240 respondents completed the survey (response rate: 63.6%) from all six surveyed centers (128 respondents with involvement with ethics consultation, 112 respondents without). Health care professionals not previously involved with formal clinical ethics processes were less likely to view the ethics committee as having a role in resolving the presented clinical ethical dilemmas ( p = 0.01 for analysis of variance comparison).ConclusionIn this multi-center survey study, health care providers without previous involvement with formal clinical ethics processes were less likely than those with previous involvement to support a role for ethics committees aiding in ethical case resolution. (shrink)

We sought to evaluate whether health care professionals’ viewpoints differed on the role of ethics committees and hospitals in the resolution of clinical ethical dilemmas based on practice location. We conducted a survey study from December 21, 2013 to March 15, 2014 of health care professionals at six hospitals. The survey consisted of eight clinical ethics cases followed by statements on whether there was a role for the ethics committee or hospital in their resolution, what that role might be and (...) case specific queries. Respondents used a 5-point Likert scale to express their degree of agreement with the premises posed. We used the ANOVA test to evaluate whether respondent views significantly varied based on practice location. 240 health care professionals completed the survey. Only three individual queries of 32 showed any significant response variations across practice locations. Overall, viewpoints did not vary across practice locations within question categories on whether the ethics committee or hospital had a role in case resolution, what that role might be and case specific queries. In this multicenter survey study, the viewpoints of health care professionals on the role of ethics committees or hospitals in the resolution of clinical ethics cases varied little based on practice location. (shrink)

Attempted suicide represents a personal tragedy for the patient and their loved ones and can be a challenge for acute care physicians. Medical professionals generally view it as their obligation to aggressively treat patients who are critically ill after a suicide attempt, on the presumption that a suicidal patient lacks decision making capacity from severe psychiatric impairment. However, physicians may be confronted by deliberative patient statements, advanced directives or surrogate decision makers who urge the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining (...) treatments based on the patient’s underlying medical condition or life experience. How acute care providers weigh these expressions of patient wishes versus their own views of beneficence, non–maleficence and professional integrity poses a significant ethical challenge. This article presents a case that exemplifies the medical and ethical tensions that can arise in treating a patient following a suicide attempt and how to approach their resolution. (shrink)

India now constitutes approximately 17% of the world’s population and has a high proportion of younger people. Philosophy for school children aims to create better citizens of the future. In this article, I establish the need to teach philosophy to children in schools, especially in India. Subsequently, I discuss the readiness of Indians to accept philosophy in the school curriculum, their conundrum in understanding the need for philosophy in a school setting, and the East-West dilemma concerning the teaching of philosophy (...) in schools. The concept of self-realization is important in education. Socrates claimed that an unexamined life is not worth living. However, the self-realization concept of the West differs from that in India. While the former perceives self-realization as a way to construct a good individual, the latter has always emphasized the cessation of the individual and focused on the incomprehensible truth human languages cannot capture. Western philosophy is concerned with questioning, inquiry, and the problems of philosophy. The East is concerned with bringing such questioning to an end. Matthew Lipman focuses on increasing curiosity, accelerating the thinking process, teaching logic and formal reasoning, and the intellectual enhancement of children. Indian philosophy, yoga, and meditation are all concerned with the cessation of consciousness. The key question concerns the approach one may choose to adopt in teaching philosophy – accelerating or decelerating the thought processes of children? Indian parents are the primary decision-makers in their children’s education, and sometimes throughout their careers and lives. Unless clarity emerges in the Indian and global community regarding this issue, there is no clear starting point for teaching philosophy to children in India. This article aims to raise critical awareness among global citizens regarding this conundrum in the collective Indian psyche. Unless the world’s psyche is inserted into the place of the Indian psyche, the great barrier between the West and the East regarding philosophy in the school curriculum cannot be bridged. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of a theory of economic freedom. In this endeavor, we build our framework on the Hayekian notion of freedom because it explicitly embodies the obvious link between freedom and the state: freedom is an absence of state coercion except for that which enforces abstract, general rules known beforehand. We derive two propositions from this Hayekian thesis and elaborate on them, leading to a categorization of government actions from the viewpoint (...) of economic freedom in which the criterion against which coercive governmental actions must be evaluated is the rule of law, meaning a government’s reliance on general, abstract rules. As an implication, our framework allows us to argue for the imperative differentiation between “efficiency” and “economic freedom” as two separate criteria against which government actions can and must be evaluated. We also show that our framework may help explain the process through which economic freedom enhances growth. (shrink)

In Bancoult, a majority of the House of Lords upheld the British government's use of the royal prerogative to expel the population of the Chagos Islands from their homeland. The majority acknowledged that the government's treatment of the Chagossians was disturbing, but held that the law left them with no choice but to hold the orders valid. In this article, I draw a parallel between this decision and the 18th-century judicial response to the Zong affair—where over a hundred slaves were (...) thrown off a ship to drown in the sea. Both decisions are cloaked in formalist rhetoric but, as I show through an examination of the law as it stood prior to each of the decisions, the actual legal reasoning in both decisions is so without basis as to be unsustainable on any formalist or legalist account. Rather, the decision in Bancoult, like the decision in the Zong, shows all the hallmarks of being a purely pragmatic one, prompted by broader concerns as to the practical impact of a contrary decision and the precedent it would set. The inherent limitations of this mode of judicial reasoning make its deployment in Bancoult troubling. (shrink)

BackgroundIn this study, medical errors are defined as unintentional patient harm caused by a doctor’s mistake. This topic, due to limited research, is poorly understood in Malaysia. The objective of this study was to determine the proportion of doctors intending to disclose medical errors, and their attitudes/perception pertaining to medical errors.MethodsThis cross-sectional study was conducted at a tertiary public hospital from July- December 2015 among 276 randomly selected doctors. Data was collected using a standardized and validated self-administered questionnaire intending to (...) measure disclosure and attitudes/perceptions. The scale had four vignettes in total two medical and two surgical. Each vignette consisted of five questions and each question measured the disclosure. Disclosure was categorised as “No Disclosure”, “Partial Disclosure” or “Full Disclosure”. Data was keyed in and analysed using STATA v 13.0.ResultsOnly 10.1% intended to disclose medical errors. Most respondents felt that they possessed an attitude/perception of adequately disclosing errors to patients. There was a statistically significant difference when comparing the intention of disclosure with perceived disclosures. Most respondents were in common agreement that disclosing an error would make them less likely to get sued, that minor errors should be reported and that they experienced relief from disclosing errors.ConclusionMost doctors in this study would not disclose medical errors although they perceived that the errors were serious and felt responsible for it. Poor disclosure could be due the fear of litigations and improper mechanisms/procedures available for disclosure. (shrink)

This paper encapsulates the debate as to whether or not tarka is an additional source of knowledge. In this regard, Jaina thinkers opine that they are, unlike Buddhists and Nyāya thinkers, an additional source of knowledge, for what we come to know through tarka is not known through any other means of knowledge. En route, Jaina’s understanding of tarka is put forth, thereafter their criticism of others’ understanding is supplied. Eventually, some recent discussions over this debate are intimated that seem (...) to go in support of Jaina understanding of tarka. These recent discussions hint at the direction in which Jaina thinkers need to advance their stand. (shrink)

Ramana Maharsi is one of the lesser lights of modern Indian thought but a major figure in the context of modern Advaitic thought in Hinduism. Modern Indian thought in general is distinguished by a robust confidence in the efficacy of effort as an expression of free will, a confidence it shares with the temper of the West in general and which it may have imbibed by coming in contact with it. Modern Advaitic thought, as represented by its popular modern exponents (...) such as S. Radhakrishnan and T. M. P. Mahadevan, shares this confidence. Ramana Maharsi, however, strikes, at least at first glance, a somewhat discordant note. The purpose of this paper is to present his view on the time–honoured debate between predeterminism and free will and to analyze its philosophical implications. (shrink)

The present research paper, entitled “Concern for Future Generations: Some Perspectives” begins with revisiting a number of ideas related with the future dressed generations from the perspective of Environmental Ethics. One of the scholarly works which I have addressed here: Work by Gregory S.Kavka who has explained the problem of future generations in the essay, “The Paradox of Future Individuals”. Moreover, I have tried to highlight the view points where the scholars been addressed, fundamentally coincide and differ from each other. (...) In the concluding part of the paper I have brought into focus 'the Buddhist theory of kamma and how the actions performed by individuals have an impact on future generations. I have shown how the actions of an individual in the present may address our concerns about the future generations. Does kamma legitimize concern for the future generations? (shrink)

This paper is based on my understanding and analysis of a number of ideas related with the body with the sole intention of over viewing the diverse understanding of the body and its functioning. Buddhaghosa’s understanding of the body seems to be negative to many. I have viewed the body from the perspective of Buddhaghosa within his work The Path ofPurification. Buddhaghosa points out the reality of the body and its underlying foulness and the human tendency to camouflage its foulness (...) under the veil of superficial make up, which are altogether temporary by nature. I will also be dealing with the concept of donation of the body, from the perspective of the Buddhist school of thought. Within the other part of this work I will be dealing with the understanding of the body viewed from the perspective of the feminists. Within this part of the paper, I will make an effort to re-reflect upon Buddhaghosa’s understanding of the body, which seems to have an essence of the “gendered” notion within itself.Keywords: Body, Understanding of body, Donation, Buddhism, Feminist. (shrink)

If an object changes its spatial position over time, or moves from one place to another, we say that the object is in motion. But in Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy reality of motion has been questioned. Nāgārjuna, the renowned philosopher in Mādhyamika school, has argued that motion is an absurd concept—it is _empty_. In the second chapter of _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (_Gatāgata-parikṣā_) Nāgārjuna examined the notion of motion and showed that motion exists neither in past, nor in present, and nor in future—the notion (...) of motion is paradoxical. This paper intends to critically examine those arguments from a realist point of view, and tries to demystify the paradox analyzing its nature and origin. Nāgārjuna’s arguments on motion have two different interpretations, and the paper shows that it is possible to counter both of the interpretations from the Nyāya point of view. The paradox does not arise in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ontology. The paper also tries to find out why the paradox arises in Nāgārjuna’s theoretical framework. This paper also examines Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the commencement and cessation of motion and shows how these arguments could be answered from a realist point of view. In this context the paper also examines a modern interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s arguments offered by Westerhoff (J Indian Philos 36(4):455–479, 2008). Nāgārjuna argues that motion and mover are mutually interdependent, hence have no intrinsic nature—they are empty and absurd. He uses this argument as an argument template to refute other notions like _pramāṇa_ and _prameya_. This paper analyzes that argument template and shows that the argument from mutual interdependence can also be countered. Time is an important presupposition for an account of motion. Nāgārjuna refutes the reality of Time which implies that there cannot be any motion. But the Naiyāyikas have refuted this position and presented arguments in favour of the reality of time. It supports the claim that motion exists—it is not an absurd concept. (shrink)

BackgroundFamily presence during adult cardiopulmonary resuscitation is still not widely implemented. Based on empirical evidence, various national and international professional organizations recommend allowing relatives to be present during resuscitation. However, healthcare providers worldwide are still reluctant to make it standard care.PurposeThis paper is a part of an ongoing cross-cultural study that aims to solicit attitudes of healthcare providers working in emergency departments towards family presence during cardiopulmonary resuscitation. This paper reports the qualitative data from surveying healthcare providers working in an (...) emergency department at a university-affiliated hospital in Singapore.MethodHealthcare workers were asked to fill out an online survey, including both quantitative and qualitative questions. Their attitudes were critically analyzed and compared with existing empirical data.ResultsMajority of healthcare workers believed that relatives should not be present during c... (shrink)

A literature search indicates an absence of research into boy’s experiences of physical education in classes in which there is a significant majority of girls. The aim of the study was to examine how boys in such classes experience their PE lessons. The methodological approach was qualitative, and data were collected with interviews of 13 boys in classes with more than 90% girls at a Norwegian high school. The data were analyzed with QSR NVivo 10, focused on creating categories of (...) meaning, in which students’ experiences were taken as subjectively true. The data are based on subjective constructions, which students constructed as part of their own interpretations and reflections on what had occurred in PE at the school. Results of the study came out in the form of three main findings. Two of those relate to a negative experience and the third to a positive experience of PE. The boys mostly felt that they are physically superior and have to consider the girls. Furthermore, the boys reported little challenge and feelings of mastery while being together with passive girls who are allowed to choose the activities. However, the boys found it easier to show off in front of the teachers and classmates when there were just a few boys in the class. The results are discussed in relation to gender-related theory on how the respondents are producing a traditional male gender in PE through their mastery, strength, and ambition to compete. We suggest a new approach of teaching that is more student-centered. A strategy could be to include other activities than sport-based activities into PE – activities that do not require strength and other athletic skills leading to feelings of hegemonic masculinity. A larger focus on social interactions during PE classes – activities in which students’ sex is not as important as in traditional teacher- and sport-centered PE classes, may be a good strategy. (shrink)

For almost 400 years, it has been a struggle to find the right words to describe Katherine Jones, Lady Ranelagh. When she died in 1691, followed a week later by her youngest brother, Sir Robert Boy...

This article focuses on the relationship between democracy and the notwithstanding clause in s.33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A number of scholars argue that s.33 is inherently ‘democratic’, as it is an assertion of legislative supremacy. The most influential such theory is Jeremy Waldron’s. This article offers a democracy-based critique of Waldron’s democracy-based account of the notwithstanding clause. The argument that the notwithstanding clause is necessarily ‘democratic’ ignores the constitution of the legislature through elections and the (...) risk of self-dealing by the legislative branch, adopts an idealistic view of legislatures at odds with the reality of executive dominance and party discipline, and over-relies on the assumption that the electorate will ensure retrospective accountability for misuse of s.33. Contrary to Waldron and those who have adopted his arguments in Canada in the context of the Charter, the article argues we can be democrats and have faith in the capacities of legislators and voters while still maintaining skepticism about the uses to which the notwithstanding clause may be put. In short, s.33 is not inherently democratic. The political morality of each use of the notwithstanding clause—including whether it helps or harms democracy—must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The concept ‘hereditary breast cancer’ is commonly used to delineate a group of people genetically at risk for breast cancer—all of whom also having risk for other cancers. People carrying pathogenic variants of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are often referred to as those having predisposition for ‘hereditary breast cancer’. The two genes, however, are when altered, associated with different risks for and dying from breast cancer. The main risk for dying for carriers of both genes is from ovarian cancer. (...) These biological facts are of philosophical interest, because they are the facts underlying the public debate on BRCA1/2 genetic testing as a model for the discussion of how to implement genetic knowledge and technologies in personalized medicine. A contribution to this public debate describing inherited breast cancer as ‘biological citizenship’ recently printed in Med Health Care and Philos illustrated how fragmented and detached from the biological and socio-political facts this debate sometimes is. We here briefly summarize some of the biological facts and how they are implemented in today’s healthcare based on agreed philosophical, ethical and moral principles. The suggestion of a ‘biological citizenship’ defined by hereditary breast cancer is incorrect and ill-advised. ‘Identity politics’ focusing hereditary breast cancer patients as a group based on a bundle of ill-defined negative arguments is well known, but is supported neither by scientific nor philosophical arguments. To those born with the genetic variants described, the philosophical rule of not doing harm is violated by unbalanced negative arguments. (shrink)

Letter: Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the World's Religions Commenting on “Leaping into the Boundless: A Daoist Reading of Comparative Religious Ethics” by Francisca Cho, “Moral Reason, Risk, and Comparative Inquiry” by Robin W. Lovin, “Heuristic Power as the Test of Theory” by Ronald M. Green, and “The Author Replies” by Francisca Cho.

Félix Guattari mentioned an ‘ecology of the virtual’. This notion is developed in this article along two dimensions. The first dimension, which is conceptual, relates the mental or subjective ecology of The Three Ecologies to the ‘functors’ of Schizoanalytic Cartographies. The other dimension takes into consideration today’s context in Brazil, especially Amerindian struggles. I focus on how Guattari’s thinking of the virtual, in dialogue with other contemporary authors, opens the way to heterogenetic processes, with their own ecopolitical consequences.

Lifestyle-induced diseases are becoming a burden on healthcare, actualizing the discussion on health responsibilities. Using data from the National Association for Heart and Lung Diseases ’s 2015 Health Survey, this study examined the public’s attitudes towards personal and social health responsibility in a Norwegian population. The questionnaires covered self-reported health and lifestyle, attitudes towards personal responsibility and the authorities’ responsibility for promoting health, resource-prioritisation and socio-demographic characteristics. Block-wise multiple linear regression assessed the association between attitudes towards health responsibilities and individual (...) lifestyle, political orientation and health condition. We found a moderate support for social responsibility across political views. Respondents reporting unhealthier eating habits, smokers and physically inactive were less supportive of health promotion policies. The idea that individuals are responsible for taking care of their health was widely accepted as an abstract ideal. Yet, only a third of the respondents agreed with introducing higher co-payments for treatment of ‘self-inflicted’ conditions and levels of support were patterned by health-related behaviour and left-right political orientation. Our study suggests that a significant support for social responsibility does not exclude a strong support for personal health responsibility. However, conditional access to healthcare based on personal lifestyle is still controversial. (shrink)